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Abstract: Following a severe contraction in the early 1990s, the Swedish economy accumulated a strong record of 
output growth coupled with a disappointing performance in the labor market. As of 2005, hours worked per 
person 20–64 years of age are 10.5 percent below the 1990 peak and a mere one percent above the 1993 trough. 
Employment rates tell a similar story. Our explanation for Sweden’s weak performance with respect to market 
work activity highlights the role of high tax rates on labor income and consumption expenditures, wage-setting 
arrangements that compress relative wages, business tax policies that disfavor labor-intensive industries and 
technologies, and a variety of policies and institutional arrangements that disadvantage younger and smaller 
businesses. This last category includes tax policies that penalize wealth accumulation in the form of owner-
operated businesses, a pension system that steers equity capital and loanable funds to large incumbent 
corporations, and legally mandated job-security provisions that weigh more heavily on smaller and younger 
businesses. We describe these features of the Swedish institutional setup and provide evidence of their 
consequences based largely on international comparisons.  
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1.  Introduction 
Ten studies comprising the NBER-SNS project on The Welfare State in Transition were 
completed in 1995.1 The project research team, ten American and ten Swedish economists, 
first gathered in Stockholm during the fall of 1992 amidst the worst crisis to hit the Swedish 
economy since the 1930s. Output fell sharply for the second year in a row in 1992, interest 
rates skyrocketed, and unemployment reached levels not seen for half a century. Moreover, as 
of the early 1990s, the long-term growth performance of the Swedish economy had been weak 
for more than two decades, leading to a sizable drop in per capita income relative to other 
advanced economies. This backdrop of immediate crisis and longer term stagnation fostered a 
strong sense of urgency in the research team, which undoubtedly contributed to the overall 
success of the project.  
 
Looking back, it is clear that the Swedish economy turned around in 1993–94. Since then, 
growth has been impressive from a European perspective, and one must return to Sweden’s 
golden age in the 1960s to find comparable rates of output growth. But these output gains 
came with a worrisome lack of job creation. Aggregate employment in 2005 was 5 percent off 
its 1990 level, despite a population increase of more than 5 percent. Hours worked per person 
20–64 years old in 2005 were a mere 1 percent above their 1993 level and 10.5 percent below 
the 1990 level. This disappointing employment and hours performance is all the more striking 
in light of Sweden’s strong record of output growth since 1993. 
 
Our explanation for Sweden’s weak performance with respect to market work activity 
stresses a particular cluster of institutions that shape “the social structure of payoffs” and the 
organization of productive activity.2 We describe these institutions and provide evidence on 
their consequences. We do not seek to provide an exhaustive characterization of Sweden’s 
institutional setup, because a modern society has many formal and informal institutions that 
differ greatly in terms of economic significance. Hence, some judgement is required to 
identify and characterize the important institutions. To form a compelling analysis and 
interpretation of economic performance, this judgment must be backed by evidence.  
 
One way to assess the significance of particular institutions is to investigate whether they 
explain notable outcome differences across countries and distinctive aspects of economic 
organization and performance within countries. We have pursued this approach in several 
studies, often with a focus on Sweden.3 Much of our previous work, including our original 
contribution to the NBER-SNS project, evaluates the consequences of Swedish institutions by 
comparing Swedish outcomes to those in the United States, a country with a very different 
institutional setup. Our earlier work also features many-country comparisons that treat 
Sweden and the United States as two among many points along an institutional or policy 
spectrum. Under both approaches, we relate distinctive aspects of the institutional setup in 
                                                 
1 The studies were published in Freeman, Topel and Swedenborg (1997). 
2 The role of institutions has moved to the fore of mainstream explanations for economic performance, 
especially over the longer term. See, for example, North and Weingast (1989), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et 
al. (2005) and Baumol (1990), from whom we borrow the term, “social structure of payoffs.” As the first SNS-
NBER study made clear, the Swedish welfare state can be seen as an economic model, or system, defined by a 
particular mix of institutions. These institutions and the interactions among them are key determinants of 
economic performance. For instance, the combination of high marginal tax rates and narrow pre-tax wage 
dispersion discourages labor supply under the Swedish model, but this effect has been mitigated by making labor 
force participation a requirement for access to many highly subsidized services (Lindbeck 1982). 
3 See Davis and Henrekson (1997, 1999, 2005a, 2005b), Davis and Rivera-Batiz (2006), Henrekson and 
Johansson (1999) and Henrekson and Jakobsson (2003).  2   
Sweden and other countries to a range of outcomes. Evidence that particular institutions affect 
outcomes in many countries or influence several different outcome variables in the directions 
implied by economic reasoning lends greater confidence to the view that they matter in a 
significant way.  
 
In our choice of outcome variables, we also seek to shed light on the mechanisms by 
which particular institutions affect economic performance. For example, we investigate 
whether and how tax policies and wage-setting arrangements affect the allocation and use of 
capital and labor inputs. We also seek to reach rough judgments about the economic 
efficiency of these effects. To that end, we sometimes interpret U.S. outcomes as emerging 
from an institutional setup that yields a relatively efficient deployment of capital and labor 
inputs. Based on this premise, we find evidence that several aspects of Sweden’s institutional 
setup encourage the misallocation of physical capital, less efficient organizational forms for 
carrying out productive activity, and an inefficient allocation of work time within the market 
sector and between the market and home sectors. Inferences of this sort do not prove that the 
U.S. institutional setup is superior to the Swedish setup, but they do highlight certain costs 
that should be weighed against benefits of the Swedish system. 
 
Several elements of Sweden’s institutional setup figure prominently in our explanation for 
its weak labor market performance: high tax rates on labor income and consumption 
expenditures, wage-setting arrangements that compress relative wages, business tax policies 
that disfavor labor-intensive industries and technologies, and a variety of policies and 
institutional arrangements that disadvantage younger and smaller businesses. This last 
category includes tax policies that penalize wealth accumulation in the form of individual and 
family-owned small businesses, a pension system that steers equity capital and loanable funds 
to large incumbent corporations, and legally mandated job-security provisions that weigh 
more heavily on smaller and younger businesses.  
 
In the next section, we review the evolution of output and work activity in Sweden during 
recent decades and compare the Swedish experience to that of the United States and other 
countries. We highlight the anemic recovery of employment and hours worked in Sweden 
since 1993. Section 3 summarizes the main analyses and findings in our previous studies of 
institutional arrangements and their effects on national outcomes. We provide evidence that 
several aspects of the Swedish institutional setup hamper smaller and younger businesses and 
repress the growth of service-oriented industries that compete closely with home production 
and the black market. In Section 4, we consider institutional developments in Sweden since 
the early 1990s. We describe important aspects of these developments and offer some analysis 
of their potential consequences. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Swedish Output Growth and Work Activity 
2.1 Output  Growth 
 
Beginning in the mid to late 1960s, Swedish GDP growth slowed relative to earlier 
decades and relative to other rich countries. Income per capita fell from 3
rd or 4
th place among 
OECD countries in 1970 to 17
th place in 1993, dropping some twenty percentage points 
relative to the OECD average (Lindbeck 1997, Henrekson 2001). Since the 1993 trough, the 
Swedish growth record has greatly improved relative to the contemporaneous performance in 
other rich countries and relative to the previous two decades. As shown in Table 1, Sweden’s 3   
output grew almost 3 percent per annum from 1994 to 2005, well above the average pace in 
the EU-15 and the OECD. In terms of per capita GDP growth, Sweden even outperformed the 
United States over this period. No doubt, rapid growth after 1993 partly reflects a rebound 
from an unusually deep contraction in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the Swedish economy 
had not experienced such rapid growth on a sustained basis since the 1960s, a decade often 
seen as the golden age of the Swedish Model.4 
 
Table 1  Real GDP growth in Sweden, the United States, the EU-15 and the OECD from 
1994/95 to 2004/05 (percent p.a.). 
 
 GDP  GDP  per  capita 
 1994–2005  1995–2005  1994–2004 1995–2004 
Sweden 2.90  2.79 2.63 2.59 
United States  3.32 3.26 2.19 2.13 
EU-15 2.29*  2.24* 2.00  1.94 
OECD 2.77  2.72 1.83 1.78 
* Data for 1994/95–2004 used. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (online: SourceOECD); data for EU-15 from EuroStat (online).  
 
Sweden’s rapid growth in recent years has not translated into comparable gains in relative 
income. Following Lindbeck (1997), Figure 1 shows PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in Sweden 
relative to the average for 23 rich OECD countries from 1950 to 2004. Real income began to 
decline relative to other rich countries in the mid 1960s and continued to decline for nearly 
three decades, reaching a low point in 1993. Since then, Sweden’s relative income rose by 
four percentage points, considerably less than one might expect from the positive growth 
differential in Table 1. The modest gain in Sweden’s real income position reflects 
deterioration in its terms of trade (Håkansson and Lindbeck 2005).  
 
Figure 1  Purchasing Power Parity Adjusted GDP per Capita in Sweden as a Percentage of 





Note: The OECD figures are for Lindbeck’s (1997) “23 rich OECD countries”, which exclude Mexico, Turkey, 
Poland, South Korea, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The OECD statistics concern current PPPs, while the 
Penn World Tables (PWT) concerns fixed PPPs in 1985 dollars (variable: RGDPCH). The PWT comparison has 
been achieved by a population-weighting of the income levels in the respective countries, and then the resulting 
series has been scaled so that the 1970 level is identical to the level of the OECD series in 1970.  
Source: Penn World Tables and OECD, National Accounts (online: SourceOECD), June 2005. 
 
The industry composition of Swedish output growth in recent years is also noteworthy. As 
reported in Table 2, manufacturing accounts for 41 percent of the real output gains in 
Sweden’s market economy from 1994 to 2005.5 Nearly half of the output growth within 
                                                 
4 The average GDP growth rate in Sweden was 4.10 percent in 1966–70, 5.2 percent in 1961–65 and 3.4 percent 
in 1951–60 (Statistics Sweden). 
5 When measuring GDP from the production side Statistics Sweden calls this “Total market producers and 
producers for own final use”. This roughly corresponds to total production excluding government production. 
However, it should be noted that incorporated production units wholly owned by the government such as the 
postal service, housing owned and run by local governments, and incorporated public hospitals are classified as 
market producers. 4   
manufacturing took place in Electrical and optical products. This aspect of Swedish output 
growth is particularly striking in light of manufacturing’s falling share of output and, 
especially, employment in the world’s rich countries in recent decades. The terms-of-trade 
deterioration noted above has probably helped stimulate the growth of Sweden’s 
manufacturing output (measured at constant prices). 
 
 
Table 2  Decomposition of Swedish Nongovernment GDP Growth, 1994–2005. 
 







total real value 
added growth, 
1994–2005 
Total market producers and producers for own final use  100.0  49.7  49.7 
Producers of goods  40.9  63.0  21.9 
Producers of services  59.1  41.4  23.4 
      
Producers of goods  40.9 63.0  21.9 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  3.5  –1.3  0.0 
Mining and quarrying  0.4  22.8  0.1 
Manufacturing 26.6  95.2  20.6 
Electricity, gas and water works  4.3  5.6  0.2 
Construction industry  6.1  13.9  0.8 
      
Producers of services 59.1  41.4  23.4 
Wholesale and retail sale  14.3  51.9  6.1 
Hotels and restaurants  1.8  35.5  0.6 
Transport, storage and communication  9.5  45.3  3.8 
Financial institutions and insurance companies  7.3  39.1  2.0 
Real estate, renting and business service companies  22.8  30.4  6.7 
Educational, health and social work establishment  1.6  88.3  1.5 
Other community and personal service establishment  1.8  51.6  1.0 
      
Manufacturing 26.6  95.2  20.6 
Food product, beverage and tobacco industry  2.3  14.7  0.3 
Textiles, clothing and leather industry  0.4  –11.2  0.0 
Wood and wood products  1.2  82.7  0.8 
Pulp and papers; publishers and printers  4.3  6.6  0.2 
Coke and petroleum products  0.2  118.9  0.2 
Chemicals 2.6  113.6  2.3 
Rubber and plastic products  0.7  42.5  0.3 
Other non-metallic mineral products  0.6  17.0  0.1 
Basic metals; fabricated metal products  3.5  30.4  1.0 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  3.5  44.9  1.3 
Electrical and optical products  3.0  1164.9  9.7 
Transport equipment  3.6  121.1  3.0 
Manufacturing industry n.e.c. 0.6  31.1  0.2 
Note: Growth figures are based on constant prices, reference year 2000. Due to different weights and variations 
in the value added growth between industries, the subparts will not add up to the total market when accounting 
for the contribution to total real value added growth. 
Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
 
 
Outside manufacturing, the greatest contributions to the growth of Sweden’s market 
economy occurred in trade, transportation and communication, real estate and business 
services. Output grew relatively rapidly in education, health and community and personal 5   
services, but from a very modest base. We will return to the performance of market-based 
services below in our analysis of Sweden’s institutional setup. 
 
 
2.2  Market Work Activity 
 
Figure 2 displays cumulative changes in Sweden’s employment and population since 
1950. As stressed in our original study, the second half of the 20
th century saw almost no net 
job growth in Sweden’s private sector, even though the working-age population expanded by 
roughly a million persons. In contrast, government employment grew more than one-for-one 
with the working-age population until 1990.  
 




Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
 
The early 1990s marked a pronounced departure from employment patterns in earlier 
decades in two respects. First, government and private employment fell sharply relative to the 
working-age population. The employment-population ratio fell by roughly ten percentage 
points within a few years, and the open unemployment rate soared to levels not seen since the 
Great Depression. Second, the partial employment recovery after 1993 occurs almost 
exclusively in the private sector. In fact, private sector employment exceeded its previous 
peak in Sweden by 2001, while government employment remains well below the levels of the 
1980s. Private sector employment fell again after 2001, however, and aggregate employment 
remains well below its peak in 1990. 
 
Despite the impression given by Figure 2, the extent to which the Swedish private sector 
has rediscovered a capacity for job creation is unclear. Some of the measured gains in private 
sector employment reflect changes in legal form of organization rather than new job creation 
within the private sector. For example, when a regional government incorporates its hospitals, 
employment at these hospitals is reclassified into the private sector. As a somewhat different 
example, when a publicly funded private school substitutes for a municipal school, the effect 
is to boost measured employment in the private sector. 
 
Turning to international comparisons, Figure 3 compares the Swedish employment record 
since 1970 to the record in the United States and the rest of the OECD. Relative to population, 
employment was much higher in Sweden until the deep contraction of the early 1990s. It then 
fell below the value in the United States and greatly narrowed the gap relative to the average 
of other countries in the OECD. As the figure shows, the longer term path of the employment-
population ratio differs greatly between Sweden and the United States, and both differ from 
the average path in the rest of the OECD. 
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Figure 3  Employment as a Share of Total Population in Sweden, the United States and the 




Note: The OECD series is a population weighted series. OECD consists of the 25 “original” OECD countries 
excluding the U.S. and Mexico. 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook (online: SourceOECD), June 2006. 
 
Table 3 presents a breakdown of employment and employment growth in Sweden’s 
nongovernment sector from 1994 to 2005. Nongovernment employment grew by 11.3 
percent, and all of the net gains occurred in the service sector. Sizable contributions to 
nongovernment employment growth occurred in Wholesale and retail trade, Real estate, 
renting and business services, and Education, health and social work. Manufacturing 
employment fell by 3 percent despite a 95 percent gain in real value added (Table 2).  
 
Although widely studied, employment and unemployment statistics have serious 
limitations as measures of overall work activity. Definitions of employment and 
unemployment are seldom straightforward, and they change over time and differ among 
countries in ways that defy easy comparisons. As we now discuss, employment and 
unemployment data are especially problematic as measures of labor market performance and 
work activity levels in Sweden. 
 
Official statistics for Sweden show high rates of employment in the working-age 
population. For example, Statistics Sweden reports an employment rate of 77 percent in 2004 
for persons 20–64 years of age. This figure reflects many “employed” persons who are not 
actually working – including those on sick leave, some students and conscripts, some persons 
on unpaid leave, people on paid parental leave, and people on temporary leave to care for a 
sick child. Sickness leave, in particular, is a major source of absenteeism in the Swedish 
economy. Because official employment statistics make no adjustment for sickness leave and 
other factors just mentioned, they overstate Sweden’s aggregate labor input. The OECD 
(2005, p. 82) estimates that the number of persons actually at work in Sweden is 10 
percentage points lower than the “employment rate” for men and 15 percentage points lower 
for women. 
 
Official unemployment measures in Sweden also paint an overly strong picture of labor 
market performance. The open unemployment rate in Sweden was 5.5 percent as of 2004, 
according to Statistics Sweden, but several more comprehensive measures of unemployment 
have been suggested. They generally include all or part of the following categories: people on 
sick leave, parental leave, leave to care for family members, and unpaid leave and participants 
in labor market programs, discouraged workers, people on welfare, and early retirees. It is 
virtually impossible to agree on an exact number, but expansive concepts of Swedish 
unemployment yield figures in the range of 18 to 24 percent of the labor force (Edling 2005).  
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Table 3 Decomposition  of  Swedish Nongovernment Employment Change, 1994–2005.  
 










Total market producers and producers 
for own final use  100.00 11.30  11.30 
Producers of goods  42.0  –1.9  –0.8 
Producers of services  58.0  20.9  12.1 
      
Producers of goods  42.0 –1.9  –0.8 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  5.2  –26.4  –1.4 
Mining and quarrying  0.3  –1.1  0.0 
Manufacturing 27.2  –3.0  –0.8 
Electricity, gas and water works  1.2  15.2  0.2 
Construction industry  8.0  14.7  1.2 
      
Producers of services 58.0  20.9  12.1 
Wholesale and retail sale  20.1  7.1  1.4 
Hotels and restaurants  4.1  16.7  0.7 
Transport, storage and communication  10.3  0.5  0.1 
Financial institutions and insurance 
companies 3.2  6.0  0.2 
Real estate, renting and business service 
companies  12.6 51.0  6.4 
Educational, health and social work 
establishment 3.3  77.6  2.6 
Other community and personal service 
establishment 4.4  16.8  0.7 
      
Manufacturing 27.2  –3.0  –0.8 
Food product, beverage and tobacco   2.6  –15.0  –0.4 
Textiles, clothing and leather industry  0.6  –31.7  –0.2 
Wood and wood products  1.4  2.7  0.0 
Wood and wood products  4.0  –22.2  –0.9 
Pulp and papers; publishers and printers  0.1  –10.3  0.0 
Coke and petroleum products  1.3  3.0  0.0 
Chemicals 0.9  1.3  0.0 
Rubber and plastic products  0.7  –16.4  –0.1 
Other non-metallic mineral products  3.7  12.4  0.5 
Basic metals; fabricated metal products  3.6  3.1  0.1 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  3.1  –9.8  –0.3 
Electrical and optical products  3.2  21.5  0.7 
Transport equipment  2.1  –12.5  –0.3 
Note: The third column is calculated as the first column multiplied by the second and divided by 100. 
Employment is defined as number of persons. 
Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB) and authors’ calculations. 
 
As a broad measure of labor input, hours actually worked per person is a more useful 
indicator, and one that sidesteps some of the conceptual and measurement issues that arise 
with employment and unemployment measures. At a minimum, hours-based measures of 
work activity shed additional light on the behavior of aggregate labor inputs. Motivated by 
these remarks, Figure 4 displays the evolution of average hours worked in Sweden since 8   
1990.6 Hours worked per person 16–64 years old fell by 11 percent from 1990 to 1993 (from 
1325 to 1178 hours). The recovery from 1993 to 2005 is only a tiny 8 hours. Hours worked 
per person of working age in 2005 are 10.5 percent below the level of 1990.  
 




Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
The data on hours worked in Figure 4 derive from self-reported measures in samples of 
persons. As of 2004, average reported hours of work per employed person is 1,630. This 
figure may well be an overstatement, given the incidence of part-time work, sick-leave 
absenteeism, parental leave, training, etc. among those counted as employed in Sweden. Some 
support for this view comes from a survey of 500 firms collected by the Confederation of 
Swedish Employers. According to this source, the average number of actual hours worked 
among full-time employees in the private sector is 1,554 hours in 2005.7 In comparison, the 
average of self-reported hours worked for all employees in 2004 is about 5 percent higher. In 
this regard, it should be noted that absenteeism of every kind as well as part-time work is 
more prevalent in the public sector. Additional evidence comes from OECD estimates for 
average hours by full-year equivalent workers in 2002, accounting for various kinds of 
absences. According to OECD (2005, Table 4.1), the estimate for Sweden is only 1349 hours, 
dramatically lower than self-reported hours. (The corresponding European average is 1567 
work hours.) In short, these comparisons suggest that official statistics substantially overstate 
market work activity in Sweden.  
 
Figure 5 shows average hours per person of working age from 1956 to 2003 in Sweden 
and the United States.8 Average work time evolves along remarkably different paths in the 
two countries, with Americans working much less than Swedes in the 1950s and much more 
by the 1990s. Among Swedes 15–64 years of age, work time fell by more than 200 hours per 
year from 1956 to 1972. Swedish work time then fluctuated in a narrow band for 15 years, 
before recovering somewhat in the late 1980s and plummeting to new lows in the 1990s. 
Hours per working-age Swede dropped by 11.5 percent from 1261 in 1990 to 1116 in 1993. In 
contrast, average hours among working-age Americans rose rapidly from 1179 in 1982 to 
1413 in 2000, and then fell sharply after 2000 from a very high base. According to these data, 
Americans spend 150 hours more per year in market work activity than Swedes as of 2003. 
 
                                                 
6 Measures of hours worked are also subject to errors and interpretation difficulties. In this regard, we note that 
Statistics Sweden revised their estimates of the annual number of hours worked per employed person upward in 
the early 2000s. For example, the figure for 1997 (as reported in the OECD Employment Outlook) was revised 
upward by 78 hours. 
7 See Svenskt Näringslivs Tidsanvändningsstatistik, a quarterly publication. The data on work and absenteeism 
cover 200,000 employees at 500 firms with roughly 2500 establishments. Reporting firms have chosen to 
participate, so the response rate is 100 percent.  
8 We rely on international data on average hours worked per person of working age supplied by Rogerson 
(2006), who compiled the data from OECD sources and from data made available by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Center at http://www.ggdc.net/index-dseries.html#top. The Groningen data on annual hours 
worked are “intended to include paid overtime and exclude paid hours that are not worked due to sickness, 
vacation and holidays, etc.” Nevertheless, since the Groningen data rely heavily on official national sources, they 
are subject to the same concerns expressed in the text regarding inaccurate reports of hours actually worked. 
These concerns apply to the data for all countries, but they may be more serious for Sweden.  9   





Source: Rogerson (2006), as compiled from OECD sources and the Groningen Growth and Development Center. 
 
Large national differences in the level and time path of average hours worked hold more 
broadly among rich countries, as Rogerson (2006) effectively highlights. Compared to other 
rich countries, the United States experienced unusually large gains in average hours worked 
after the early 1980s, but Australia, Canada and New Zealand had similar experiences. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, among other countries, 
experienced large declines in average work time from high levels in the 1950s and 1960s, 
much like Sweden. Average hours fell even more sharply in Germany, France and Italy. They 
fell by smaller amounts from higher starting points in Switzerland and Japan. Greece, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Spain experienced large increases in average work hours after the late 
1980s, partly reversing declines in previous decades. The overall picture is one of remarkable 
heterogeneity among rich countries in the evolution of average work time.  
 
Figure 6 displays the joint evolution of average work hours and per capita output in 
Sweden and the United States. The prevailing longer term pattern in Sweden is one of output 
gains accompanied by decreases in average work hours. In sharp contrast, the prevailing 
pattern in the United States is one of output gains accompanied by increases in average hours. 
Judging by the experience of these two countries in recent decades, there is no natural 
tendency for the amount of time devoted to market work activity to either rise or fall as per 
capita output rises. Instead, the long term response of market work activity appears to depend 
greatly on country-specific features. 
 
Figure 6  The Joint Evolution of Average Work Hours and Per Capita Output in Sweden and 




Note: Average hours is average annual hours worked among persons 15–64 years of age. Real output is 
measured in 2000 SEK and USD, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ calculations on data from Rogerson (2006) and OECD sources. 
 
 
2.3  Time Use Surveys 
 
The preceding section draws on standard sources for data on employment and hours 
worked in the market sector. Time use surveys allow for a broader view of work activity that 
includes time devoted to (unpaid) work activity outside the market sector. We draw on 
evidence from time use surveys to briefly address three questions. First, how much time do 
Swedish and American adults devote to work activity outside the market sector? Second, how 
does the composition of time spent outside paid employment differ between the two 
countries? Third, how do trends in the amount of time devoted to overall work activity 
compare to those for market work activity? 
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Table 4  Time Use Breakdown, Sweden and the United States Compared. 
 
 
Men and Women, 20–74 Years Old 
 













1. Study  0.21 0.28 –0.07 
2. Travel (excluding travel during work)  1.30 1.44 -0.15 
2.a. Commuting to and from work  0.32 0.33 –0.01 
3. Free Time  15.51 15.55 –0.04  –13
3.a. Personal Care 10.29 10.43 –0.14 
3.b. Leisure Activities  5.22 5.12 0.10   37 
4. Work  6.38 6.26 0.12  43
4.a. Paid Employment 3.90 3.53 0.38  138 
4.b. Domestic Work (excluding child care)  2.47 2.73 –0.26 –95
Food prep, dishwashing 0.55 0.89 –0.35 –126
Cleaning dwelling 0.36 0.38 –0.02 
Laundry 0.20 0.17 0.03 
Construction and repairs, gardening, pets 0.56 0.59 –0.03 –12
Shopping and services 0.53 0.43 0.10 35
Other 0.28 0.27 0.01 
5. Child Care (Unpaid)  0.50 0.38 0.13  47
6. Unspecified Time Use  0.11 0.10 0.00 
   
Domestic Work + Child Care 2.98 3.11 –0.13  –48 
Leisure Activities + Child Care  5.72 5.49 0.23  84
Note: Personal care includes sleep, eating and other personal care activities. Leisure includes unpaid volunteer 
work outside the household and care of adults who do not reside in the household. Large breaks at work (e.g., 
time spent on lunch break) are classified as part of paid employment under work-related activities, but short 
breaks are treated differently for the two countries. They are classified as work time for Sweden and as leisure 
time for the United States. 
Sources: Sweden: Harmonised European Time Use Survey (HETUS) Pocketbook at 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/dsis/tus/library?l=/comparable_statistics/sweden_25_01xls/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 




Table 4 addresses the first two questions, drawing on time use data for persons between 
20 and 74 years of age in Sweden (2000–2001) and the United States (2004). On average, 
Americans spend 138 more hours per year in paid employment than Swedes according to the 
time use data, very similar to the extra 150 hours per year according to labor force surveys 
(Figure 5). However, Swedes spend an extra 95 hours per year in domestic household work, 
excluding child care. In other words, the U.S.-Swedish difference in time spent on overall 
work activity, inclusive of domestic household work, is less than one-third the difference in 
time devoted to paid employment.9 If unpaid child care is treated as part of domestic work 
activity, then the extra time devoted by Swedes to nonmarket work activity falls by half.  
 
                                                 
9 Olovsson (2004) reaches a similar conclusion from tabulations in Juster and Stafford (1991) of time devoted to 
nonmarket work activity in Sweden and the United States in the 1980s.  11   
Remarkably, Table 4 indicates that Americans enjoy more leisure time than Swedes – an 
extra 37 hours per year, and an extra 84 hours per year if unpaid child care is treated as 
leisure. Another striking feature of the comparison pertains to time devoted to meals in the 
domestic household sector. Swedes spend an extra 126 hours per year, roughly 2.4 hours per 
week, on food preparation and cleanup. These patterns in the data are consistent with a theory 
of tax effects on task assignment and time allocation described in Section 3.2 below. They are 
also consistent with evidence described below of how taxes on consumption expenditures and 
labor income alter the mix of market production activities.  
 
Turning to trends in time use, Aguiar and Hurst (2006) document changes in time devoted 
to leisure and work activity from 1965 to 2003 by Americans aged 21 to 65, excluding 
students and early retirees. They find very large increases in leisure time of 6 to 9 hours per 
week for men and 4 to 8 hours per week for women. The precise figure depends on the exact 
definition of leisure and the variables used to control for shifts in demographic structure. 
Among men, the rise in leisure mainly reflects a decline in time devoted to paid employment. 
Among women, it reflects a large decline in time devoted to domestic work that more than 
offsets rising time in paid employment. Total work time, paid employment plus domestic 
work, declined by about 8 hours per week for both men and women over the period covered 
by their study. In sum, working-age Americans enjoyed large gains in leisure time after 1965 
with no decline in time devoted to paid employment (Figure 5). Since Americans spend a 
larger portion of their adult years in retirement now than in decades past, the gains in leisure 
time among all adults are even larger than suggested by the findings of Aguiar and Hurst. We 
are unaware of a comparable study for Sweden, but Statistics Norway reports very similar 





We summarize the main points of this section. First, despite Sweden’s rapid output growth 
since 1993, there has been little net job creation and almost no gain in market work hours per 
person. Swedes 16–64 years old spend 10 percent fewer hours in market work activity than in 
1990. Second, Sweden has experienced a considerable shift away from public sector 
employment since 1990. It is unclear how much of this shift reflects newly created jobs in the 
private sector rather than a reclassification of existing employment positions. Third, the time 
path of market work hours is strikingly different in Sweden and the United States over the 
past several decades. Fifty years ago, Swedes spent 200 more hours per year than Americans 
in market work activity; today, they spend 150 fewer hours. Fourth, broader measures of work 
activity that encompass time spent on unpaid domestic work show a much smaller gap 
between Swedes and Americans. Based on a comparison of recent time use surveys, we find 
that American adults spend an extra 43 hours per year in overall work activity. Swedes spend 
considerably more time than Americans in unpaid domestic work, especially food preparation 
and cleanup, and Americans actually enjoy greater leisure time.  
 
 
3.  Main Thesis and Lessons from Earlier Work 
Our earlier work holds that institutional arrangements strongly influence national 
economic performance. In line with this broad thesis, we develop several pieces of evidence 
                                                 
10 At http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/02/20/tidsbruk_en/.  12   
and analysis that country-specific institutional arrangements have important effects on work 
activity, industry structure, activity shares of smaller and younger businesses, and the size of 
the underground economy. 
 
 
3.1  The Role of Wage-Setting Institutions  
 
Sweden has a compressed wage structure compared to most other rich countries. That is, 
Sweden has relatively narrow wage gaps between men and women and relatively small wage 
differentials by industry, education, experience and tenure on the job. Wage inequality among 
observationally similar workers is also low in Sweden. As discussed in Davis and Henrekson 
(2005b), much evidence points to Swedish wage-setting arrangements as a major reason for 
its compressed wage structure.  
 
The evidence that wage-setting arrangements help shape the Swedish wage structure leads 
naturally to questions about their role in determining other outcomes. For example, how do 
labor market institutions that compress wage differentials affect the industry distribution of 
employment? The economic logic behind this question is straightforward: If relative wages 
influence the allocation of workers and cooperating factors of production, then institutional 
forces that compress wage differentials also affect the structure of employment. To address 
this question, some of our earlier work examines the evolution of Sweden’s industry 
distribution of employment from 1960 to 1994 and compares it to the U.S. distribution over 
the same period. Specifically, we relate the evolution of U.S.-Swedish differences in the 
industry distribution of employment to the structure of relative wages between and within 
industries.  
 
In Davis and Henrekson (2005b), we find that centralized wage setting pushed the 
Swedish employment distribution in three directions: away from low-wage industries, away 
from high-wage industries, and away from industries with high wage dispersion among 
workers. In other words, centralized wage-setting arrangements compressed the wage 
distribution, and as a consequence, steered the employment structure towards middle-wage 
jobs. These effects intensified as centralized wage setting spread through the Swedish 
economy after the 1950s, and they reversed after the dissolution of centralized wage setting 
commenced in 1983. The estimated effects of centralized wage setting in Davis and 
Henrekson (2005b) are large, at their peak accounting for 40 percent of U.S.-Swedish 
differences in industry structure. They also account for much of the evolution in the U.S.-
Swedish differences in industry structure between 1970 and 1994. Although wage-setting 
arrangements in Sweden are no longer so highly centralized, collective bargaining remains an 
important force for wage compression in many sectors.11  
 
Institutional pressures for wage compression also disadvantage smaller businesses and 
shift the size distribution of employment toward larger businesses. Two observations support 
this claim. First, an extensive literature consistently finds higher wages at larger employers, 
even after exhaustive efforts to control for observable worker characteristics and other job 
attributes.12 This strong empirical regularity implies that wage compression on the employer 
                                                 
11 For a systematic review of the evidence that collective bargaining tends to compress wage differentials, see 
Blau and Kahn (1999). 
12 Oi and Idson (1999) review the evidence in this regard. 13   
size dimension raises relative labor costs for smaller employers.13 Second, the available 
evidence also indicates that residual wage dispersion is greater at smaller employers. In a 
study of the U.S. manufacturing sector, Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) find a pronounced 
negative relationship between employer size and wage dispersion among workers after 
conditioning on education, experience and gender. Lallemand and Rycx (2005) find the same 
pattern for a broader set of industries in Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Spain. This pattern 
suggests that standard rate compensation policies, which closely tie wages to readily observed 
characteristics of workers and jobs, are less advantageous or more costly for smaller 
employers. Hence, the strong tendency for collective bargaining and centralized wage-setting 
arrangements to produce standard rate compensation structures works to the disadvantage of 
smaller employers.  
 
Partly motivated by this reasoning, Davis and Henrekson (1997, 1999) investigate the size 
distribution of business activity in Sweden. By a variety of measures, large firms play a bigger 
role in Sweden than in most other European countries. In addition, compared to the United 
States, the Swedish employment distribution tilts away from industries with a more important 
role for smaller firms and establishments. These patterns in the data are consistent with the 
view that institutional pressures for wage compression disfavor smaller businesses, but, as we 




3.2  Tax Burdens on Consumption and Labor 
 
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures encourage substitution from the 
legal market sector to home production and the underground economy. To appreciate the 
power of taxes to depress employment and distort production decisions, consider the choice 
between market provision and home production in the simple case with no capital inputs. The 
household opts for the least-cost source of supply. In the absence of taxes, we can express the 
household’s decision rule as 
 







>⇔ >  (1) 
 
where 
P W is the wage rate of the professional supplier in the market, 
P H  is the production 
time required by the professional, 
B W is the opportunity cost of household time, and 
B H is the 
time input required in household production. According to (1), the law of comparative 
advantage governs the choice of production sector. The household opts for self supply when it 
has comparative advantage at the production activity in question and for market provision 
when the professional has comparative advantage. This decision rule is socially efficient in 
the sense of minimizing the value of scarce time resources used up in production.  
 
Taxes break this link between privately optimal decisions and socially efficient outcomes. 
To see this point, let t denote the tax rate on the household’s labor income, let s denote the 
                                                 
13 However, Albaek et al. (1998) find an hourly wage elasticity with respect to plant size for Sweden that is 
similar to the elasticity for the United States. This result is surprising to us, because numerous empirical studies 
find that Sweden’s wage structure is highly compressed relative to the U.S. wage structure on other dimensions. 
In addition, international studies by Teulings and Hartog (1998) and Lallemand et al. (2005) find that the 
magnitude of the size-wage elasticity declines with the degree of centralization and coordination in wage setting.   14   
payroll tax rate on the professional’s compensation, and let m denote the tax rate on 















As seen in (2), higher tax rates raise the threshold comparative advantage ratio at which the 
market solution dominates. The private choice of production sector is now governed by a tax-
distorted law of comparative advantage.14 Too few tasks are carried out in the market sector 
because of taxes, and too little time is spent working in the market. Conversely, too many 
tasks are carried out in the household (or underground) sector, and too much time is spent 
working outside the formal market sector.  
 
As tax rates rise, marginal producers in the market sector are displaced by less efficient 
producers in the household sector. This displacement effect lowers average productivity 
computed over the market and household sectors, but it raises official productivity measures 
because they do not encompass the household sector.15 Hence, the displacement effect also 
leads official statistics to overstate true productivity in high-tax societies relative to that of 
low-tax societies. This effect operates even when all workers have the same productivity and 
earnings ability in market-based activities. Thus, the productivity effect identified here is 
distinct from the idea that the tax and transfer system has bigger disemployment effects on the 
least productive workers.  
 
To assess whether tax rates in the relevant range significantly alter the composition of 
market-based activity, Davis and Henrekson (2005a) consider fourteen rich countries with 
comparable data on tax rates and the industry distribution of market activity. They identify 
tax-sensitive industries on a priori grounds, then investigate whether such industries have 
lower employment and output shares in high-tax countries. As seen in Figure 7a and b, 
employment and output shares are markedly lower in a broad group of tax-sensitive industries 
that includes retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and consumer repair services.16 An increase 
in the tax-distorted comparative advantage ratio by 25 basis points lowers the employment 
share in this industry group by 2.4 percentage points, or 12 percent of industry employment 
evaluated at the mean. Similarly, a 25 basis point rise lowers the value-added share by an 
estimated 1.9 points (13 percent). Davis and Henrekson also find that the share of market 
activity accounted for by eating, drinking and lodging establishments is twice as sensitive to 
taxes as the broader industry group considered in Figure 7a and b. In contrast, the share of 
employment in manufacturing shows a positive, statistically insignificant relationship to the 
tax-distorted comparative advantage ratio. These cross-country patterns support the view that 
                                                 
14 Davis and Henrekson (2005a) derive analogous decision rules when production requires capital and labor.  
15 If firms differ in their ability to evade taxes, then taxes need not crowd out the least productive firms. In this 
case, taxes can lower average productivity and raise average pre-tax production costs within the formal market 
sector. See Palda (1998) for an analysis of this issue. Strand (2005) analyzes the efficiency consequences of 
taxation in a model with three production sectors – the above-ground market economy, the black-market 
economy and production for own use in the household. He also provides an extensive set of references to other 
work on the efficiency effects of income and consumption taxes in models with taxed and untaxed production 
sectors. 
16 Domestic household help, child care services and personal services are probably among the most tax-sensitive 
activities, but they are excluded in Figure 7 because these activities are not classified in the same way across 
countries, or because they are not reported at a sufficiently disaggregated level. In addition, several countries 
provide sizable subsidies for child care services that are not captured by our tax measures. 15   
taxes on labor and consumption distort the choice of production sector and, in the process, 
depress employment in the formal market economy. 
 
Figure 7  Tax Burdens and the Share of Measured Activity in Trade, Eating, Drinking, 
Lodging and Consumer Repair Services, 14 Rich Countries in 1995. 
 
7(a): Percent of Total Employment in Selected Services and Tax-Distorted Comparative 
Advantage 
 




Source: Reproduced from Davis and Henrekson (2005a). 
Note: Each panel shows a scatter plot and an ordinary least squares regression line with standard error of the 
slope coefficient in parentheses. See Davis and Henrekson (2005a) for details regarding the data and the 
calculation of the tax-distorted comparative advantage ratios.  
 
These results also help to explain certain aspects of Sweden’s industry structure. In 
particular, compared to countries with lower tax burdens on consumption expenditures and 
labor income – e.g., Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States 
– Sweden has small employment and output shares in retail trade, consumer repair services, 
and eating, drinking and lodging establishments. Production activity is relatively labor 
intensive in these industries and relatively easy to substitute between the market sector and 
home production (or the underground sector). Hence, high tax burdens push production 
activity in these industries out of the (legal) market sector. This interpretation finds additional 
support in Table 4, which shows that Swedes devote considerably more time to domestic 
household work, especially meal preparation and dish washing, than Americans.  
 
Another type of evidence on tax-induced displacements of employment and production is 
available from official adjustments to Swedish GDP accounts. Statistics Sweden now makes 
upward adjustments to official measures of GDP in an effort to capture unrecorded black 
market activity. These adjustments go back to 1993 and they are largely based on an inquiry 
carried out in 1997 by the National Audit Office (1997). Table 5 reports the official 
adjustments by industry in 1996. The largest adjustments are for Auto repair, Restaurants, 
Taxi services and Hairdressing, and the smallest are for Industry and Consulting. These 
patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that high tax rates and burdensome regulations 
shift the mix of (above-ground) market production away from labor-intensive activities (e.g., 
Restaurants and Hairdressing) and toward capital-intensive and skill-intensive activities (e.g., 
Industry and Consulting). A new comprehensive inquiry conducted in 2005–06 and published 
by the Swedish National Tax Board (2006) found results consistent with the 1997 study. Total 
black market work is estimated at 4–5 percent of GDP.17 An estimated 13 percent of all 
persons aged 18–74 engaged in black market work within the previous year, an increase of 2 
percentage points compared to the 1997 study. Hours worked in the black market are 
estimated to have increased in roughly the same proportion.18 
                                                 
17 Indirect methods for estimating the size of the black market economy in Sweden tend to produce much larger 
numbers. See, for example, Table 4.3 in Schneider and Enste (2002). 
18 More specifically, a special inquiry into the underreporting of revenue in Restaurants indicates an increase in 
black market activity in recent years: “The Swedish National Tax Board estimates, based on an extensive audit 
of the restaurant industry in the county of Dalecarlia, that the unreported revenue in the restaurant industry in 
1995 nationwide amounted to 37 percent of total revenues of 20 billion kronor, or approximately 7 billion 16   
 
Table 5  Adjustments to Official GDP for Black Market Activity by Statistics Sweden, 
1996. 
 
Industry  Black Market Activity, % 





Auto repair  26.4
Restaurants 16.2
Taxi services  19.2







Source: SOU 2002:113. 
 
Our cross-country investigation in Davis and Henrekson (2005a) also finds that higher tax 
rates on labor income and consumption expenditures lead to less work activity in the formal 
market sector as a whole and to a larger underground economy.19 Consider, for example, a 
12.8 percentage point difference in the tax rate between two countries, which amounts to a 
unit standard deviation in the cross section of countries. Using data for the mid-1990s and our 
preferred specification, we estimate that a tax increase of this size leads to 122 fewer hours 
worked per adult per year in the formal market sector, a drop of 4.9 percentage points in the 
employment-population ratio, and a rise in the underground economy equal to 3.8 percent of 
GDP. Evaluating at means in our cross-country sample, the implied elasticity of aggregate 
hours worked with respect to the combined tax rate on labor and consumption is –0.55. As we 
explain in our earlier work, our estimates reflect the direct effect of taxes on labor supply and 
labor demand plus the effects of tax-funded welfare and social insurance programs on labor 
supply incentives. 
 
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures also alter relative labor demands 
among workers in a potentially important manner. Tax-sensitive industries include eating and 
drinking establishments, laundry and cleaning services, child care, consumer repair services, 
domestic household help, and most personal services. As suggested by this list, tax-sensitive 
sectors tend to rely heavily on less skilled workers with lower schooling and wages. Hence, 
uniform tax rates on labor income and consumption expenditures have disproportionately 
                                                                                                                                                          
kronor. The degree of tax evasion has subsequently accelerated. More recent estimates suggest that unreported 
revenues amount to roughly double in 2002, i.e. 15 billion kronor.” (Skattestatistisk Årsbok 2004, p. 238; 
authors’ translation). 15 billion kronor amounts to 102 percent of total value added in Restaurants in 2002 
according to the National Accounts.  
19 Many other studies investigate the role of tax rates in cross-country differences in work activity and the size of 
the underground economy. Several recent studies in this area are motivated by the provocative work of Prescott 
(2004). See Alesina et al. (2005), Davis and Henrekson (2005a), and Rogerson (2006) for references to this 
literature.  17   
large negative effects on the demand for less skilled workers, depressing their relative wages 
and employment opportunities. 
 
The interaction of wage-setting institutions and high tax rates is also important in the 
Swedish case. Institutions that compress pre-tax wages reinforce tax-induced distortions in the 
choice between market provision and home production. To see this point, consider first the 
impact of institutional forces that raise wages for less-skilled, lower wage workers. As we just 
remarked, activities with easy substitution between home and market production rely heavily 
on less-skilled workers in the production process. Hence, wage floors for less-skilled workers 
raise the cost of production by a larger percentage in activities with easier substitution 
between home and market production. In this respect, wage floors for less-skilled workers 
reinforce the departures from comparative advantage induced by taxes on labor and 
consumption. Second, institutional forces that reduce wages for skilled workers affect their 
choice between home production and market provision in the same way as higher labor 
income taxes. In this respect, too, labor market institutions that compress pre-tax wage 
differentials reinforce tax-induced departures from the law of comparative advantage in the 
choice of production sector.  
 
 
3.3  Other Policies that Influence Ownership, Financing and Hiring 
 
The preceding discussion indicates that Sweden’s compressed wage structure and high tax 
burdens on labor and consumption disadvantage smaller businesses and depress employment 
and output in industries that compete closely with the black market or unpaid household 
production. Our earlier work also identifies several other aspects of the Swedish institutional 
setup with similar effects on the size and industry distribution of employment and production. 
We briefly discuss these features in the balance of this section.  
 
Corporate Tax Policy 
Beginning in the early 1960s, and continuing for three decades, effective tax rates on 
business income in Sweden differed tremendously by source of finance and ownership 
category. Debt was the most tax-favored form of financing, and new equity issues were the 
most penalized. Business ownership positions held directly by individuals and families were 
taxed much more heavily than other ownership categories. To illustrate the magnitude of 
these differences, Table 6 presents effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of 
owners and sources of finance. Three categories of owners and three sources of finance are 
identified. The effective marginal tax rates are calculated assuming a 10 percent pre-tax real 
rate of return, an asset holding period of ten years, and an asset composition that matches the 
actual composition in manufacturing. A negative entry in Table 6 means that the real rate of 
return is greater after tax than before tax.  
 
Differences in effective tax rates on Swedish business income were especially large 
around 1980. For example, a debt-financed business investment in 1980 offering a pre-tax real 
return of 10 percent yielded an after-tax return of 18.3 percent for a tax-exempt institution 
such as a pension fund. The same business investment financed by a new equity issue 
purchased directly by households yielded an after-tax real return of –3.7 percent. More 
generally, debt financing was highly favored by the tax system throughout the period covered 
by Table 6, and direct household ownership positions were heavily disfavored. King and 
Fullerton (1984) and Fukao and Hanazaki (1987) find that Swedish tax policy was extreme in 18   
these respects compared to other countries. Furthermore, the Swedish tax system generally 
subsidized housing investment, while simultaneously discouraging direct business ownership.  
 
These differences in effective tax rates have potentially powerful effects on the 
organization of business activity and the industry mix of productive activity. A few examples 
serve to make this point. First, to the extent that debt financing is less costly and more readily 
available for larger and better established firms, high statutory tax rates coupled with tax-
deductible interest payments work to the disadvantage of smaller firms and potential entrants. 
As we explain below, Swedish credit market policies hampered access to debt financing by 
younger and less established firms. Second, debt financing is more easily available to firms 
with ready forms of collateral. Hence, firms and sectors that intensively utilize physical 
capital reap greater benefits from tax code provisions that favor debt financing. This aspect of 
the tax system favors capital-intensive industries and modes of production relative to labor-
intensive ones. Indeed, Södersten (1984) provides evidence that, beginning in the 1960s, 
effective marginal tax rates on business income in manufacturing fell considerably relative to 
most other industries. Third, high tax rates on business income accruing directly to 
households repress many of the same activities as high tax rates on labor and consumption. 
Many economic activities that are highly substitutable between market provision and home 
production (e.g., cooking, cleaning, laundering, landscaping, home repairs) offer greater than 
average scope for self employment, employment in small firms, start-ups, and family-owned 
businesses. Hence, high effective tax rates on business income accruing directly to households 
works against a vibrant entrepreneurial and small-firm sector. 
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Table 6  Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Business Income in Sweden by Ownership 
Category and Source of Financing, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1991. 
 




1960   
Households 27.2 92.7 48.2 
Tax exempt institutions –32.2 31.4 31.2 
Insurance companies –21.7 41.6 34.0 
      
1970   
Households 51.3 122.1 57.1 
Tax exempt institutions –64.8 15.9 32.7 
Insurance companies –45.1 42.4 41.2 
      
1980   
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9 
Tax exempt institutions –83.4 –11.6 11.2 
Insurance companies –54.9 38.4 28.7 
      
1985   
Households 46.6 112.1 64.0 
Tax exempt institutions  –46.8 6.8 28.7 
Insurance companies –26.5 32.2 36.3 
      
1991   
Households 31.7 61.8 54.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –9.4 4.0 18.7 
Insurance companies 14.4 33.3 31.6 
Note: The calculations assume a real pre-tax return of 10 percent, an asset holding period of 10 years, an asset 
composition identical to the actual composition in the manufacturing sector, and the following inflation rates: 3 
percent in 1960, 7 percent in 1970, 9.4 percent in 1980, and 5 percent 1985 and 1991. The calculations conform 
to the general framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984).  
Source: Jan Södersten, see also Södersten (1984, 1993). 
 
Credit Market Policy 
The Swedish credit market was highly regulated throughout the postwar period until the 
late 1980s. Priority was given for lending to the public sector and housing. The credit volume 
to other sectors was generally subjected to quantitative restrictions and the rate of interest was 
also regulated, which resulted in a situation of virtually continuous credit rationing (SOU 
1982:52; Jonung 1994). This set of regulations clearly favored credit access by larger, older, 
well-established firms and by capital-intensive firms with ready sources of collateral. 
 
Savings Policies 
Sweden’s mandatory national pension system (ATP) instituted in 1960 transformed the 
public sector into the most important supplier of credit. Large surpluses were accumulated in 
the national pension funds, the so-called AP funds. By the early 1970s, the AP funds 
accounted for 35 percent of total credit supply (Pontusson 1992). The institutionalization of 
savings benefited large, well-established firms with good credit ratings and the ability to 
operate with high debt-equity ratios. The gradual introduction of mandatory supplementary 20   
pension schemes reinforced this effect.20 Moreover, the very high marginal tax rates on 
individual income – the top marginal rate was close to 90 percent in the early 1980s – in 
combination with fully tax-deductible pension contributions created a strong incentive for 
individuals to channel savings to large institutions (as a rule highly regulated) and thus 
reduced the supply of equity financing for potential entrepreneurs and extant small businesses. 
 
Since the availability of equity financing is a critical factor for both startups and rapidly 
expanding young businesses (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Lindh and Ohlsson 1996; 
Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994), the low rate of personal savings in Sweden probably hampered 
startups and high-growth young firms.21  
 
Labor Market Regulations 
New labor market regulations in the 1970s gave organized labor a greater influence on 
corporate decision making. The Codetermination Act of 1976 mandated union representation 
on corporate boards of directors (Pontusson 1992). The Employment Security Act (LAS) of 
1974 gave employees extensive protection against dismissal. The only legal grounds for 
dismissal under the act are gross misconduct and redundancies. In the latter case, LAS 
stipulates a ”last in – first out principle.” Strict employment security provisions are probably 
costlier for smaller and younger firms because their employment levels are more volatile. 
Both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the rate at which employers destroy job 
positions decline with the size, age and capital intensity of the employer.22 These patterns in 
worker separation and job destruction rates suggest that any costs imposed by the LAS fall 
more heavily on younger, smaller and less capital-intensive businesses and shift the 
distribution of market activity towards industries characterized by longer job tenures and 
relatively stable employment at the level of individual businesses. 
 
Government Monopolization of Production 
By 1990, the public sector accounted for more than one third of total employment in 
Sweden. The expansion of public sector employment from 1950 to 1990 resulted from 
political decisions to produce many income-elastic services such as health care, care for the 
elderly, child care and higher education almost entirely in the public sector. Over time, these 
political decisions had a profound impact on the character of business activity in the private 
sector. In particular, the production of many services that might have been supplied by the self 
employed and by small business organizations was instead supplied by the state. In line with 
this claim, Davis and Henrekson (1999) report that Sweden had the lowest rate of self 
employment among OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s, an unusually high share of 
employment in larger firms compared to other European countries, and an unusually high 
concentration of corporate ownership and control. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The AP fund system also benefited incumbents through the so-called ”lending back” system (återlån) based 
on the rule that employers were allowed to borrow up to half the amount they had paid in to the fund during the 
previous year. The potential for using this credit channel was therefore proportional to the firm’s wage bill in the 
previous year. This type of lending was abolished in 1987. 
21See also Cressy and Olofsson (1997) and further studies cited in Henrekson and Jakobsson (2005), which find 
that small and medium-size Swedish firms have a preference for financing expansion with retained earnings or 
equity supplied by the original owners relative to debt financing and equity from new sources.  
22 For evidence regarding these patterns in the United States, see Brown and Medoff (1989), Davis, Haltiwanger 
and Schuh (1996), and Davis et al. (2006). 21   
3.4 Summary 
  
Key features of the Swedish institutional setup have depressed market work activity and 
hampered smaller and younger businesses. Heavy tax burdens on labor and consumption 
repress the market provision of services with close substitutes in the black market and home 
production. Wage-setting institutions that compress pre-tax wage differentials reinforce this 
tax effect. International comparisons indicate that market work activity is particularly 
sensitive to tax rates and wage compression in labor-intensive, service-oriented activities. 
Many activities that fit this description – such as cooking, cleaning, laundering, landscaping, 
consumer repair services and a variety of personal services – also offer greater than average 
scope for self employment, small businesses, start-ups, and family-owned businesses. Hence, 
in addition to their effects on the level and industry mix of market work activity, these two 
aspects of the Swedish institutional setup reduced the activity shares of smaller and younger 
businesses. In addition, Sweden’s corporate tax policy, job security mandates, credit market 
and savings policies and its public sector monopolization of many income-elastic services 
have also worked against smaller and younger businesses. 
 
 
4.  Institutional Developments Since 1990 and Related Evidence 
We now turn our focus to Swedish institutional developments since the early 1990s. We 
consider these developments in the light of both our earlier analyses and Swedish economic 
performance since the deep crisis of the early 1990s. 
 
 
4.1 Wage-Setting  Arrangements 
 
An important new wage-bargaining agreement was introduced in Sweden in 1997 – 
namely, the Agreement on Industrial Development and Wage Formation (Industriavtalet, 
IA).23 It covers about 800,000 workers in the manufacturing sector and 110,000 employees in 
commerce and transport. It also serves as a model for other agreements covering about 1.3 
million workers in the private sector. All told, about 60 percent of Swedish workers are 
directly covered by the IA or by other agreements modelled on it. Important sectors not 
covered by the IA include transportation, construction and much of retail trade. 
 
The IA is a further step towards more decentralised and individualised wage-setting, a 
process that is often said to have started in 1983 when the metal workers’ union defected from 
the centralized regime (Hibbs and Locking 2000). Under the IA, many agreements are 
reached that make no reference to centrally negotiated pay structures – everything is decided 
at the local level. Most agreements, however, still incorporate guarantees regarding minimum 
pay levels. The IA stipulates that trade unions and employers’ organizations must assume 
greater responsibility for wage formation by reaching special collective agreements on 
cooperation and bargaining procedures. In order to become effective, an agreement must 
include timetables for negotiations, rules concerning the appointment of impartial mediators 
and the extent of their powers, and rules concerning the termination of the agreement.  
 
The more fundamental question is whether this new wage-setting regime has also affected 
bargaining outcomes. After the demise of centralized bargaining in the early 1980s, wage 
                                                 
23 See Elvander (2002) and Djerf et al. (2003) for a more thorough description of the IA and its functioning. 22   
dispersion began to increase among blue- and white-collar workers (Edin and Topel 1997, 
Hibbs and Locking 2000, and Davis and Henrekson 2005b). As Lundborg (2005) documents, 
wage dispersion among blue-collar workers levelled off in the mid 1990s, but began to rise 
even more sharply among white-collar workers in the private sector. Moreover, average real 
wages began to increase much faster among white-collar workers. From 1995 to 2005 average 
real wages rose by 43 percent for white-collar workers as compared to 22 percent for blue-
collar workers (based on a comprehensive wage measure that includes bonuses, paid overtime 
and fringe benefits).24 Hence, the last ten years saw a considerable widening of the wage gap 
between white-collar and blue-collar workers and a sharp increase in wage dispersion among 
white-collar workers (see also Fredriksson and Topel 2007). Lundborg (2005) argues that 
increased wage dispersion among white-collar workers reflects a greater role for efficiency 




4.2 Taxes on Labor and Consumption 
 
The simple theory of task allocation sketched in Section 3.2 identifies the tax-distorted 
comparative advantage ratio as a key determinant of market work activity and its 
composition. Section 3.2 also summarizes evidence regarding the impact of consumption and 
labor taxes on the extent and industry mix of market work activity. Motivated by our earlier 
analysis, Figure 8 plots the evolution of the tax-distorted comparative advantage ratio, or tax 
factor, for three types of Swedish workers. The values in Figure 8 capture mandatory social 
security contributions, consumption taxes and marginal tax rates on labor income. 
 
Swedish workers faced modest tax factors in the early 1950s of around 2 for executives 
and lower for others. The tax factors rose steadily after 1952. By the late 1970s, they reached 
levels near 4 for industrial workers, above 5 for white-collar workers and above 8 for 
executives. The tax factors declined somewhat in the 1980s, dropped sharply with the tax 
reform of 1990/91, and crept upwards in recent years as the result of higher tax rates at the 
local government level. As of 2006, Swedish tax factors stand at 2.54 for industrial workers, 
3.44 for white-collar workers and 3.85 for executives. The corresponding tax factors for the 
US are in the interval 1.4–2. The Swedish levels are well below levels in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Still, tax factors in this range provide powerful incentives to shift production and employment 
out of the formal market sector. As a result, large parts of the service sector face harsh 
competition with unpaid work and the black market. These tax effects are amplified by 
institutions that compress the pre-tax wage distribution, as we explained in Section 3.2.  
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Source: Du Rietz (1994) and new calculations supplied by Du Rietz. 
Note: The tax factor for each category is evaluated at mean earnings each year. ”Executive” is defined as an 
individual in the management group (below the CEO) in a private firm. The tax factor includes mandatory social 
security contributions paid by the employer or the employee, the marginal income tax and indirect taxes on 
private consumption (all income is assumed to be spent for private consumption purposes). Property taxes are 
excluded. The tax wedges for executives and average white-collar workers coincide between 1991 and 1998. 
 
Figure 8 does not take account of some important tax avoidance strategies. The income 
tax code in Sweden and many other countries provides significant opportunities for 
households to reduce effective tax burdens by shifting income to tax-favored sources, by 
incurring tax-deductible expenses and by engaging in certain portfolio transactions. Prior to 
Sweden’s tax reform in 1990–1991, high-income earners “could exploit a number of asset 
transactions to escape taxation” (Agell et al. 2004). These transactions included “complex 
schemes of transforming corporate income into low-taxed capital gains,” an unlimited ability 
to subtract net negative asset income from labor income when calculating taxable income, 
tax-deductible interest payments, the purchase of tax-preferred assets with borrowed funds, 
and intra-family debt transactions. Households could also, within limits, invest in untaxed 
pension funds and tax-favored savings accounts. Agell and Persson (2000) and Agell et al. 
(2004) present several pieces of evidence that high-income Swedish households used these 
tax avoidance strategies to a significant extent. For example, “In 1980, when the income tax 
was highly progressive, [realized capital losses and tax-favored pension savings] allowed the 
average individual in decile 10 to reduce the average tax on labor income from 52.6 percent to 
42.1 percent.” While lowering effective tax rates, these avoidance strategies often lead to 
other distortions. 
 
For our purposes, the theoretical and empirical literature on these asset-based tax 
avoidance strategies yields some cautionary lessons. First, effective tax factors are 
undoubtedly smaller than reported in Figure 8. Second, the 1990–1991 Swedish tax reform 
engineered a smaller reduction in effective tax factors than suggested by Figure 8, or any 
other examination of statutory tax rates. In line with this conclusion, Malmer and Persson 
(1994) find that the discrepancy between taxable income and labor income declined 
substantially in the wake of the 1990–91 tax reform. Similarly, Agell et al. (1998) report that 
Swedish households initiated a rapid pay down of their debts in the early 1990s. Third, 
because the tax reform imposed new restrictions on asset-based tax avoidance strategies, it is 
possible that the reform actually raised effective tax rates for many high-income earners. 
Hence, without further and careful study, it is unclear whether and how much the tax reforms 
in 1990/91 stimulated employment, or how much they softened the incentives to shift certain 
production activities to the underground economy and unpaid household work. 
 
 
4.3  Taxation of Business Income 
 
The substantial tax preference for debt financing described in Section 3.3 presupposed a 
policy of strictly regulated capital markets. However, the deregulation of domestic capital 
markets in the latter half of the 1980s greatly expanded credit availability even as the tax 
system remained virtually unchanged and foreign exchange controls continued to limit 24   
investment abroad by Swedish households (Jonung 1994; Norrman and McLure 1997). Later, 
in 1991, the corporate tax rate was cut in half to its current value of 28 percent.25 The 
conversion to a dual income tax system with a 30 percent flat tax rate on capital income in 
1991 and the abolition of wealth taxation on unlisted stock in 1992 favored individual equity 
investments relative to the earlier situation.   
 
In a series of reforms between 1985 and 1994, the distortions in tax wedges across 
different owners and sources of finance were to a large extent evened out. After 1995, the 
difference between households and tax-exempt institutions in the marginal tax rates on 
equities rose once again. See Table 7 (and Table 6 for earlier years). 
 
Table 7  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners and Sources of 
Finance, 1991, 1994 and 2005. 




1991   
Households  31.7 61.8 54.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –9.4 4.0 18.7 
Insurance companies  14.4 33.3 31.6 
   
1994   
Households  32.0/27.0† 28.3/18.3† 36.5/26.5† 
Tax exempt institutions  –14.9 21.8 21.8 
Insurance companies  0.7 32.3 33.8 
   
2005   
Households  27.9/22.9† 58.1/48.1† 42.7/32.7† 
Tax exempt institutions  –1.2 23.2 23.1 
Insurance companies  18.2 44.6 42.6 
†Excluding wealth tax; the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. Hence, the higher figure applies 
only to the securities of listed companies. 
Notes: The calculations assume a real pre-tax return of 10 percent, an asset holding period of 10 years, and a 
realized inflation rate equal to the actual one in the indicated year. The calculations conform to the general 
framework developed in King and Fullerton (1984). 
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten; see Södersten (1993). 
 
When the restrictions on foreign ownership were lifted in a series of steps from 1990 to 
1993 (Reiter 2003), attention shifted to the relative treatment of foreign and Swedish owners. 
The removal of restrictions represented a significant step towards neutrality among different 
categories of Swedish owners. However, the tax burden on Swedish individual ownership 
remains heavier than the tax burden on individual ownership in most other countries 
(Henrekson and Jakobsson 2005). The more favorable tax situation of foreign owners implies 
that their pre-tax required rates of return are lower than those of Swedish owners (except for 
Swedish tax-exempt institutions), i.e., foreign owners, ceteris paribus, can pay a higher price 
for Swedish corporate assets than Swedish (rival) owners (Norbäck et al. 2006). Globalization 
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has also made it easier for large Swedish incumbents to shift their ownership stakes to foreign 
tax jurisdictions in order to reduce corporate tax burdens and escape personal taxation on 
ownership (Henrekson and Jakobsson 2005).  
 
Tax loop holes continue to channel individual wealth into institutional equity funds rather 
than owner-operated businesses. For closely held companies there are particular restrictions 
on the payment of dividends, the so-called 3:12 rules. These rules were introduced in 1991 to 
prevent owners of profitable small businesses from saving on taxes by paying themselves 
dividends taxed at 30 percent rather than wages taxed at the marginal tax rate for labor 
income. The scope for dividend payments was therefore restricted to a relatively small 
percentage of the equity capital paid in by owners. The 3:12 rules also raised the capital gains 
tax on small businesses. Until 2005 it was normally 43 percent for small closely held firms 
instead of the regular 30 percent, since half of the capital gain was taxed as wage income. 
Effective from 2006, capital gains from the sale of closely held firms is taxed as wage income 
on all gains less than SEK 4.4 million. However, the new system also entails some tax relief 
provisions and is highly complex, which makes it extremely difficult to assess ex ante its 
overall impact on effective tax rates.26 
 
Despite, and in some respects because of, recent changes, there remain a number of 
provisions in the corporate tax code that benefit large firms and institutional investors relative 
to smaller, closely held firms. To the extent that it would be efficient for more firms to be 
managed by individual entrepreneurs, the current tax system creates welfare losses. A priori, 
industries that benefit from entry by new owner-managed firms are penalized in this tax 
regime. This stands in stark contrast to U.S. corporate taxation, where dividends in the so-
called S-corporations are only taxed at the level of the owner’s personal income tax (Cullen 
and Gordon 2006). 
 
Cullen and Gordon also point out that the asymmetry in the tax treatment of business 
profits and losses is greater in Sweden than in the United States.27 Indeed, the asymmetry 
actually runs the other way in the United States in some cases. In this regard, they write: “For 
individuals in the top bracket, risk taking in start-up firms is heavily subsidized in the U.S., 
but tax penalized in Sweden.” The usual tax asymmetry discourages risk-taking activities 
even for risk-neutral owners. Since startup activities are often risky, this effect bites harder 
with respect to new firms than incumbents. It also bites harder for smaller firms insofar as 
they have more volatile profit streams and fewer opportunities to apply losses in some units to 
reduce taxes on the gains accruing to other units. For closely held firms, the disincentive to 
pursue risky activities is even stronger insofar as risk-averse owners have much of their 
wealth tied up in the firm.  
 
Furthermore, the use of stock options to encourage and reward entrepreneurial behavior 
among employees is highly penalized by the Swedish tax system, because gains on options 
are taxed as wage income if the options are tied to employment in the firm. Thus, they are 
subject both to mandatory social security contributions (33 percent) and the marginal tax rate 
on personal income.28 In practice, therefore, stock options are less attractive and effective as a 
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of business losses shared by the government through the tax system. 
28 This stands in stark contrast to the U.S. situation, where an employee who accepts stock options can defer the 
tax liability to the time when the stocks are sold rather than when the options are exercised. In the United States, 
there are typically (i) no tax consequences to the employee upon the grant or the exercise of the option; (ii) the 26   
tool for rewarding and encouraging entrepreneurial behavior. This is likely to penalize 
sectors, industries, and positions (key managers and innovators) for which options are an 
effective response to agency problems.  
 
In order to bridge the gap between founders of firms and external financiers, strategies 
have differed across countries (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2005). It is now widely recognized that 
venture capital firms can play a crucial role in the development of small entrepreneurial 
ventures by converting high-risk opportunities to a more acceptable risk level through 
portfolio diversification, and by adding key competencies that the firm lacks. These goals are 
achieved by arrangements that align the incentives of the three agents – investors, venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs (Zider 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001). However, the above-
described tax schedules apply to the venture capital industry as well, which means that a 
highly competent venture capital industry providing high-powered incentives to investment 
managers is much harder to develop in Sweden.29 
 
In the United States, venture capitalists often buy out the start-up entrepreneur at an early 
stage in the life-cycle of the firm (Hellmann and Puri 2002). While the entrepreneur loses 
control, he or she often becomes quite wealthy when the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur exit in an IPO (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Venture capitalists, and sometimes 
entrepreneurs, use the proceeds of IPOs to invest in new entrepreneurial ventures. In contrast, 
Swedish entrepreneurs often cling to control throughout their entire careers, showing a strong 
unwillingness to give up control rights to external financiers (Wiklund et al. 2003, Berggren 
et al. 2000). Greater emphasis on control rather than growth is consistent with the Swedish tax 
system, and it may be an important factor behind the observation that few Swedish firms 
founded in recent decades have grown to large size.  
 
 
4.4  Savings Incentives and Asset Control 
 
Sweden’s welfare state provisions undercut the main savings motives for most 
individuals. First, unemployment insurance, income-dependent pensions, sick-leave benefits, 
and highly subsidized health and care services provided by the government reduce 
precautionary savings. Second, asset-based means testing in social assistance schemes 
exacerbates this effect at the lower end of the income and wealth distribution (Hubbard et al. 
1995). Third, pay-as-you-go pension systems lower national savings and investment 
compared to funded systems (Feldstein 1996). In short, Sweden’s welfare system reduces 
national savings through at least three distinct channels. Given the scale of the Swedish 
welfare state, it is reasonable to infer that the overall negative effect on national savings is 
quite large. 
 
Not surprisingly, disposable income as a share of gross (before-tax) household income is 
low in Sweden.30  Household saving as a share of disposable income is also low compared to 
other OECD members. Net household saving, defined as disposable income minus final 
                                                                                                                                                         
employee is taxed at capital gains rates when the stock acquired upon the exercise of the option is sold after a 
specified holding period; and (iii) there is no deduction available to the employer. This shifts the tax risk in the 
options back to the government, and thus accomplishes two things: it increases the potential profit from the stock 
options and it allows budget-constrained individuals to sell stocks whenever they choose (Misher 1984). 
29 See Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) for a fuller exposition of this issue. 
30 Household disposable income is defined as current receipts of households – direct taxes on households – debt 
service by households. 27   
consumption expenditure, fell from roughly 6 percent of disposable income in the 1960s to 4 
percent in the 1970s and 1.1 percent in the 1980s.  The OECD average stayed in the 10–12 
percent range during this period.31 Household savings rates rose sharply in response to the 
crisis and the tax reform in the early 1990s, partly for the reason discussed in Section 4.2. 
However, as shown in Figure 9 savings rates came down again in the mid 1990s, and they 
have averaged only 3 percent since the late 1990s. Household financial savings exclusive of 
life insurance and pension savings have been consistently and strongly negative since 1997.  
 




Source: Statistics Sweden (online, November 15, 2006). 
Note: Life insurance savings mainly consists of tax-deductible, tax deferred savings. No disbursement from these 
savings is allowed before age 55. Collective pension savings consist of supplementary pension premiums paid by 
employers for virtually all tenured employees. Payment of such premiums is treated as a fully tax deductible 
business cost at the firm level. When pensions are paid out from life insurance and the collective schemes, the 
beneficiary is subject to income taxes at his then-prevailing marginal tax rate.  See Grosskopf, Rabe, and 
Johansson (1997) for a detailed treatment of the tax-preferred nature of life insurance and pension savings. 
 
In addition, Sweden’s system of personal taxation continues to function as a barrier to new 
business development, especially owner-managed businesses. Here, as well, there are several 
reinforcing effects. First, high tax rates on wage income make it hard for individuals and 
families to set aside funds for business start-up capital. Second, high personal tax rates on 
wealth and capital income undercut the financial rewards to direct business ownership and 
development. As of 2005, Sweden levies a 30 percent tax rate on nominal current yields 
(dividends, interest and rents), a 30 percent tax rate on nominal capital gains and a 1.5 percent 
wealth tax on private real estate holdings, interest-bearing instruments and prime listed stock. 
Third, these high tax rates encourage reliance on savings schemes that escape capital taxation 
but, in the process, restrict the owner’s control of the assets. As a key case in point, there is 
unlimited scope for saving in so-called capital pension accounts. Funds paid into such 
accounts escape wealth, income and capital gains taxation;32 but the funds cannot be 
withdrawn before age 55 and then only over a minimum period of five years. In this way, the 
tax treatment of financial assets and real property encourages the accumulation of illiquid 
assets controlled by large financial institutions rather than assets under the direct control of 
the owner. Personal financial assets with these characteristics cannot be used by the asset 
holder as working capital in an existing owner-operated business or to start a new owner-
operated business. 
 
Low savings, high personal tax rates and restrictions on asset control under the Swedish 
institutional setup make it very difficult for households to accumulate the type of financial 
resources needed for starting and developing owner-operated businesses.33 There are sound 
reasons to think that disincentives to wealth accumulation and asset control lower the 
propensity for entrepreneurship. The availability of equity financing is an important factor for 
both startups and the expansion of existing firms. In general, the riskier the business, the 
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33 Swedes can use their personal residence as collateral for business loans, which potentially mitigates the 
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greater is the reliance on equity relative to debt financing. Thus, ceteris paribus, small and 
newly established firms are more dependent on equity financing than large, well-established 
firms. Low private asset holdings also exacerbate the inherent problem caused by asymmetric 
information, because wealth-constrained would-be entrepreneurs are unable to signal forcibly 
to outside investors by making sizeable equity infusions of their own.  
 
There is also evidence supporting the idea that individual wealth affects the probability of 
becoming an entrepreneur and the propensity to expand existing businesses. For example, 
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) find that the likelihood of starting a business in Sweden increases 
significantly among those who receive an inheritance or a lottery gain. Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1994) find similar evidence for the United States. Lindh and Ohlsson (1998) find that a more 
unequal wealth distribution covaries positively with the share of self-employed over time. 
Other studies pointing to the connection between personal assets and the propensity to start a 
business include Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Taylor (2001). Hurst and Lusardi 
(2004) offer a different view of the empirical relationship between financial resources and the 
propensity to start a business. Their evidence for the United States points to a less important 
influence of financial resources. Whether their analysis carries over to a country like Sweden 




4.5  Corporate Governance and Foreign Ownership 
 
As already noted, before the 1990/91 tax reform the combined effect of taxation on capital 
gains, wealth, profits and dividends strongly discouraged individuals from owning firms and 
from wealth accumulation in general. Moreover, the tax system encouraged debt financing, 
which benefits large capital-intensive firms with closer ties to financial institutions. Not 
unexpectedly, this caused a change in ownership structure: during the post-war period, the 
household ownership share of listed stock fell sharply from 75 percent in 1950 to 18 percent 
in 1990, while the institutional share rose commensurately (Norrman and McLure 1997). 
 
There were also numerous legal impediments to foreign ownership both directly or as 
shareholders in listed firms (Reiter 2003). However, following the removal of all foreign 
exchange controls and all barriers to foreign ownership of Swedish firms and real estate in a 
series of steps between 1989 and 1993, a number of changes ensued. First, the foreign 
ownership share of listed shares began to increase rapidly. It rose from 7 percent in 1989 
when foreign exchange and ownership controls began to be lifted to 40 percent ten years 
later.34 Domestic institutions lowered their share almost as much. The foreign ownership 
share decreased somewhat again in 2001–2002 following the sharp drop in the valuation of 
firms in the information technology sector. 
 
Until the late 1980s, foreigners established themselves in Sweden mainly by making 
greenfield investments. But after ASEA merged with Brown Boveri in 1987 to become a 
Swiss-based company, many Swedish firms including some very large ones were acquired by 
foreign owners. The number of employees in wholly foreign-owned companies grew rapidly 
in Sweden over the last two decades. In 1980, approximately 113,000 Swedes were employed 
in foreign firms. By 2003, this figure rose to 564,000, and almost one out of four employees 
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in the business sector (23 percent) worked for a foreign firm in 2005 (Strandell 2000 and 
ITPS 2006).35  
 
The combined effect of foreign and Swedish taxation is a favoring of all kinds of foreign 
ownership relative to Swedish individual ownership. It seems reasonable to conjecture that 
industries and activities amenable to foreign ownership tend to be dominated by larger 
business organizations. If so, then the gains from new opportunities for foreign ownership of 
Swedish firms accrue disproportionately to larger businesses, their owners, and industries and 
activities that are better suited for larger business organizations. The effect is yet another 
institutional arrangement that favors larger business organizations relative to smaller ones.  
 
 
4.6  Government Production of Income-Elastic Services 
 
There is substantial scope for private entrepreneurs in Sweden to compete with 
government production through public procurement programs and voucher systems in 
schooling, child care, etc. In practice, however, public providers are often insulated from 
competition with private business (Fölster and Peltzman 2007). For example, the Swedish 
Competition Authority (2004) documents that government policies often implicitly favor 
public producers, because public producers do not bear the full cost of production or because 
their close ties to government procurement and production departments give them an 
informational advantage. Another example is the use of short contracts for private suppliers 
that render necessary investments risky. Dareblom (2005) studies a group of women provided 
with government support to start their own businesses in welfare services. She finds that, 
although politicians claimed they looked favorably upon private provision of tax-financed 
services, they were much less favorable ex post when high-quality suppliers threatened the 
position of public providers. 
 
Due to the de facto public sector monopolization of production in many income-elastic 
services, vast areas of the economy remain unexploited as sources of commercial growth. In 
particular in the health sector, it is easy to imagine how a different organizational mode could 
provide a basis for the emergence of new high-growth firms. Instead, large-scale production 
in the manufacturing sector has been seen as a model for central parts of the production of 
highly income-elastic services such as health care, child care, elderly care and education. This 
has had a profound effect on private sector growth – from 1960 until the late 1990s all net 
employment growth in Sweden took place in the local government sector (Rosen 1997). 
 
These publicly produced services are, in many cases, highly suitable for production in 
private and often also small firms. The political decision to produce these services primarily 
through a public sector monopoly has largely barred this area from both startup activity and 
the emergence of high-growth firms. Table 8 summarizes the share of private production for 
the major services that are fully or primarily tax-financed. The private production share is 
very low in activities like child care, care of the elderly and after-school care, despite the fact 
that these activities are highly amenable to private, small-firm production.  
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was particularly pronounced in the latter half of the 1990s. On average, they corresponded to 55 percent of total 
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Table 8  Private Sector Production Share for Major Services that are Primarily   Publicly 
Funded, 1996, 2000 and 2005 (percent). 
 
Service 1996 2000  2005 
Institutional child care (pre-school) 12.5 11.8  16.7 
Child care in the home (of the 
professional) 
2.2 8.6 12.0 
After-school care  4.5 – 9.2   
Compulsory schooling  2.4 3.9 7.4   
High school  1.9 4.4 13.4 
Care of the elderly at nursing homes  8.3 10.0 
Care of the elderly in special apartments  5.1 11.0  13.2  
Care of the elderly in their own home  2.6 7 9.7 
Hospital care  4.3 –  7.3* 
Medical consultations  28 –  28.7 
Share of doctors privately employed  10 7.3  7.0* 
Psychiatric wards  24 –  5.9 
Children’s dental care  5 –  9.8 
* 2004. 
Source: Werenfels Röttorp (1998) for 1996; Jordahl (2002) for 2000; Socialstyrelsen (2006) for care of the 
elderly in 2005, The Swedish National Agency for Education (www.skolverket.se/content/1/c4/62/39/) for all 
schooling measures in 2005 and Jordahl (2006) for health and dental care in 2006. 
 
 
4.7  Labor Market Reforms 
 
Some deregulatory measures in the labor market have been taken. In 1997 a new type of 
employment contract was allowed, so-called prearranged temporary employment, which gives 
every firm an unconditional right to employ up to five persons for a maximum of one year. 
Another 1997 change made it possible to sign local collective agreements that replace the 
regulations in the law. This makes it possible, through local (plant-level) agreements, to annul 
tenure-based orders of priority in case of dismissal, to annul the right to reemployment for 
dismissed workers, and to extend the duration of temporary employment beyond 12 months. 
In practice, this benefits larger firms that have enough clout to strike bargains with the unions, 
and it also makes it necessary to be unionized; otherwise, the law applies by default. In 2001 
firms with no more than 10 employees were allowed to exempt two employees from the “last-
in-first-out” rule in case of redundancies.36 A law passed in 1993 paved the way for an 
expansion of temporary work businesses and staffing services. These firms expanded at a 
rapid rate and by 2006 employ roughly 1.3 percent of the workforce in the private sector. 
 
On the other side of the ledger, some measures have been taken or proposed that entail 
increased obligations for firms or restrict their leeway in contracting and hiring. The 
responsibility of employers for the rehabilitation of employees on long-term sick leave has 
been extended, and employers are obligated to pay part of the sick leave compensation (15 
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percent) indefinitely.37 The latter obligation has been abolished from January 2007 by the new 
non-socialist government that took office in October 2006.  
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Since a deep economic contraction in the early 1990s, Sweden has enjoyed strong output 
growth relative to the 1970s and 80s and relative to contemporaneous experience in much of 
the OECD and EU. However, relatively rapid output growth failed to produce much recovery 
in employment or market work hours. At this writing, thirteen years after the trough in 1993, 
hours worked per person of working age remain roughly 10 percent below their peak in 1990. 
International comparisons indicate that Swedes spend considerably less time in market work 
activity than Americans and the average for European countries.  
 
This state of affairs is largely consistent with our earlier analysis and what could be 
expected from the modest changes in Sweden’s institutional setup in recent decades. In 
particular, our evidence and analysis indicate that the Swedish institutional setup strongly 
depresses market work activity, particularly in services “on the margin” between market and 
non-market provision. There have been institutional improvements in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but we do not detect a strong and consistent move toward a more work friendly set of 
institutions and policies. In our judgment, the institutional setup in Sweden has basically 
moved sideways in terms of promoting work activity, providing fertile ground for younger 
and smaller businesses and facilitating a more efficient deployment of factor inputs. In the 
same period, it is fair to say that increased global integration of markets and national 
economies has intensified the competitive pressures facing many Swedish firms and workers.  
 
One possible reaction to our evidence and analysis is a shrug of complacency. If Swedes 
choose to enjoy the fruits of economic progress in the form of more leisurely lifestyles and a 
more robust social safety net, that is a perfectly reasonable, even sensible, path to follow. We 
think this view is much too sanguine, and for several reasons. First, the dramatic drop in 
Swedish work activity in the early 1990s coincided with a sharp contraction in output and real 
incomes. Moreover, low work time is not “taken” by individuals with high income; rather, it 
mainly reflects persons of relatively modest means who work little or not at all (Björklund 
and Freeman 2007). These time-series and cross-sectional patterns do not fit a story of rising 
real incomes used to purchase additional leisure. As a related point, Swedish institutions 
prevent many persons from finding a preferred tradeoff between work and leisure. In 
particular, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) explain how employment security provisions 
coupled with unemployment benefits tied to past earnings impede the return to work after job 
loss. The effect is to raise structural unemployment in the wake of major macroeconomic 
shocks or increased levels of microeconomic uncertainty.  
 
Second, the inviting leap from low market work hours to high leisure is a treacherous one. 
Data from time-use surveys indicate that working-age Swedes devote nearly as much time to 
work as Americans, once domestic household work is factored into the comparison. Working-
age Swedes actually enjoy less leisure than their American counterparts according to our 
comparison of recent time-use surveys. Drawing on Eurostat time-use data, Ragan (2005) 
                                                 
37 The government that lost the election in September 2006 proposed legislation that would give employees on 
part-time contracts a unilateral right to demand full-time work, make it harder for employers to circumvent 
tenure rules through temporary contracts, and tighten rules against dismissal of persons on parental leave. 32   
reports that people tend to spend more time in household production activities in countries 
with low market work hours. The time-use evidence squares neatly with the evidence that 
Sweden and other high-tax countries have comparatively small output and employment shares 
in sectors that produce time-saving goods and services. 
 
Third, recent international studies find evidence of a sizable elasticity of aggregate work 
hours with respect to the combined tax rate on labor income and consumption expenditures. 
See Davis and Henrekson (2005a), Dew-Becker and Gordon (2006) and Rogerson (2006). 
Our own work based on cross-country variation in a small sample of rich countries in 1995 
yields an estimated hours elasticity of –0.55. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2006) estimate an 
elasticity of –0.4 based on time-series variation from 1960 to 2004 in a sample of rich 
countries. We interpret these estimated elasticity values as reflecting the combined effects of 
high tax rates on labor supply and demand plus the effects of tax-funded welfare and social 
insurance programs on labor supply incentives. Tax and spending effects of this magnitude 
are likely to generate sizable welfare losses in a country with a public sector as large as 
Sweden’s (Aronsson and Walker 2007). 
 
Fourth, a narrow focus on the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the tax rate 
understates the welfare costs of the Swedish institutional setup in several ways. As we explain 
in Section 3.2, the distortionary effects of high tax rates on labor and consumption are 
amplified by Swedish institutions that compress pre-tax wage differentials. As recently 
stressed by Feldstein (2006), the (static) welfare costs of taxation are generated by the 
elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates, and taxable income is probably more 
responsive than hours alone. In addition, there are dynamic efficiency losses associated with 
occupational choice, schooling attainment, and other decisions that affect human capital. 
Finally, there are other distortions that we have attributed to the Swedish institutional setup – 
namely, the misallocation of capital across sectors and the many impediments to smaller and 
younger businesses. 33   
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Figure 3 Employment as a Share of Total Population in Sweden, 
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Figure 5. Average hours worked per person 15-64 years of age, 














Sweden44   
Figure 6. The Evolution of Hours Worked Per Person 15-64
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Figure 8 Tax-Distorted Comparative Advantage Ratios for Industrial Workers, White-Collar Workers 
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